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Anatomy of a Socially Responsible Firm
Rubin Zhao
This paper investigates the relation between firm characteristics and corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) with the purpose to understand the reason for investment activities 
in CSR. We develop a principal component based approach to categorize the KLD 
fourteen-dimensions of CSR activities into two groups, namely, reactive CSR, which 
firms would apply to counter any potential fallout from CSR concerns, and proactive 
CSR, which stands for not reactive CSR activities. We find evidence supporting that (1) 
financially strong firms, older firms, and firms with more R&D expenditures are more 
likely to invest in CSR; (2) firms operating in multiple markets tend to invest more in 
reactive CSR while do the same as single market firms in proactive CSR; (3) firms tend
to increase their investment in both CSR as the level of competition decreases but reduce 
proactive CSR more in extreme high level of concentration; and (4) better corporate 
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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) includes all activities of a firm in its attempt 
to meet its legal, ethical and other discretionary responsibilities while continuing to meet 
its economic responsibilities (Carroll, 1979). Extant research has mostly focused on the 
implications of CSR. For example, the link between CSR and financial performance 
(Cochran and Wood, 1984; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Wu and Shen, 2013); CSR and 
stock market returns (Galema, Plantinga and Scholtens, 2008); CSR and firm’s cost of
capital (Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, and Mishra, 2011); and CSR’s impact on cost of bank 
loans (Goss and Roberts, 2011). Little empirical work has been done to explore the other 
side of this relationship, whereby we have a very limited understanding of what types of 
firms behave in socially responsible ways.
This paper attempts to explore the above question. It does so by empirically 
testing the various propositions laid out in Mcwilliams and Siegel (2001) and Campbell 
(2007). According to Mcwilliams and Siegel (2001) CSR represents an action that 
appears to further some social good, extend beyond the explicit interests of the firm, and 
is not required by law. According to Campbell (2007), a firm is seen to be acting in a 
socially responsible manner if it does not, knowingly do anything that could harm any of 
its stakeholders, and if it does cause some harm, it must rectify whenever the harm is 
discovered. The rectification could be a result of either voluntary or some sort of 
encouraged action. Encouragement could be moral suasion, normative pressure, legal 
threats, regulatory rulings, or other means.
Extant empirical research provides little clarity in terms of the implications of 
CSR for the economic underpinning of the firm. Margolis and Walsh (2001) catalog more 
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than 90 empirical studies attempting to establish the relationship between CSR and the 
resulting financial performance. The evidence continues to be inconclusive.1
We frame CSR into two distinct categories based on the firm’s motive for their 
undertaking. First: a set of positive CSR activities (as defined by CSR strength in the 
Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini database) taken up by the firm as a means for correcting 
the effects of negative CSR activities (which is also described as CSR concerns) that the 
firm might be generating in due course of its operations. In the spirit of Campbell (2007), 
we propose that rectification of harm suggests a greater likelihood of a positive 
correlation between CSR concerns and CSR strengths for socially responsible firms, 
because such firms are more sensitized to the negative effects of their operations. In short, 
such firms can simultaneously engage in positive and negative behaviors (Strike, Gao and 
Bansal, 2006). We refer to these as reactive corporate social responsible behavior 
Despite this 
lack of clarity, CSR has continued to gain importance in managerial practice (Knox and 
Maklan, 2004). Increasing number of Fortune 1000 companies have taken to issuing 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports. Anecdotal evidences suggest that an ever-
increasing number of businesses are engaged in serious effort to integrate CSR into their 
strategic planning. This study aims at treating CSR as the observed variable and relating 
it to firm and industry characteristics with the goal of understanding the anatomy of a 
high CSR firm/sector. Through the findings of this study we hope to provide a better 
understanding as to what motivates managers to invest in CSR despite the paucity of 
sound economic rationale.
                                                        
1 Cochran and Wood (1984) and Waddock and Graves (1997) identified positive relationship 
between CSR and financial performance, while Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield (1985), and 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) found no significant relationship between them. Wright and Ferris 
(1997) found CSR and financial performance to be negatively related.
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(RCSR). Second: all other CSR activities that the firm might be involved with; we refer 
to these as proactive corporate social responsible behavior (PCSR).
Our study builds upon the findings of Chih, Chih, and Chen (2010). They test the 
theory postulated by Campbell (2007) for a set of financial firms by contrasting the set of 
firms in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) World, with those in the Dow Jones 
World Index (but not a part of DJSI World). Their Study finds evidence suggesting that: 
(i) larger firms are more CSR minded, however, (ii) financial performance and CSR are 
not related. They also find that (iii) firms would act in more socially responsible ways to 
enhance their competitive advantages when the market competitiveness is more intense.
We contribute to this work in at least two different ways. First: Financial firms are highly 
regulated firms. Government regulations could potentially lead to different, more limited 
scope for CSR, particularly PCSR. The results from this sector cannot be generalized to 
other industries without further research. We omit utilities and financials from our sample.
Second: Chih, Chih, and Chen (2010) use a dichotomous variable to identify CSR. 
This variable takes the value one if the firm belongs to the CSR group (DJSI World) and 
zero otherwise. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) of a firm is a complex construct 
that includes a range of firm behaviors in domains such as the environment, community, 
human rights, employee relations, ethnic and gender diversity, product policy, and 
corporate governance. Actions in each of these spheres may impact firm performance in 
different ways (Brammer and Millington, 2008).  It is also possible that combinations of 
certain policies may have their own distinctive effect on the CSR and firm performance 
relationship, which further complicates the development of an aggregate CSR measure 
and thereby the study of its relationship with firm performance (Cavaco and Crifo, 2010). 
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Use of a dichotomous variable to study entire CSR could be potentially misleading. We
propose the use of principal component analysis to extract CSR factors from CSR data 
obtained from Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) database. Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) of a firm is the assessment of its CSR (Margolis et. al. 2009). These 
factors allow us to separate RCSR and PCSR.
The paper uses the CSR data collected by Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) 
database as the starting point of our analysis. This data has been extensively used in prior 
research (Jayachandran et al., 2013; Waddock and Graves, 1997). The KLD ratings 
information is well suited to CSR research as it is calculated by disinterested researchers 
using all available data on multiple aspects of CSR (Waddock, and Graves, 1997). KLD 
monitors and rates 650 to 3000 firms that constitute 500 of the largest US companies 
(increased to 1,000 largest companies in 2001, and 3,000 largest companies in 2003) and 
all firms in the MSCI KLD 400 social index. Firms are rated in seven major areas –
environment, community, human rights, employee relations, diversity, customers, and 
governance – using a set of approximately eighty indicators for strengths and concerns. 
Thus, the KLD dataset collects CSR data for a total of fourteen dimensions.
The paper is structured in the following manner: first we define reactive and 
proactive corporate social responsible behavior (RCSR/PCSR) and then we develop our 
hypothesis relating firm characteristics and CSR in the spirit of Mcwilliams and Siegel 
(2001), and, Capmbell (2007). We continue our analysis with a description of our data 




Reactive vs. Proactive CSR
Extant research suggests that CSR is closely related to reputation. Branco and 
Rodrigues (2006) propose that positive CSR enables firms to improve reputation with a 
broad range of stakeholders including customers, suppliers, competitors, bankers, and 
investors. Findings of studies such as Fombrun and Shanley (1990) and Pfau, Haigh, 
Sims and wigley (2008) suggest that when positive CSR programs are communicated to 
the public they build corporate reputation and credibility. Studies have also shown that 
reputation is related to a broad range of benefits for the firm. For example, it enhances the 
firm’s ability to attract superior job applicants (Gatewood et al. 1993), increases 
employee retention and their job satisfaction (Riordan, 1997), and it enhances firm’s 
brand equity (Dowling, 2006). Therefore, it is not entirely surprising that, in recent years 
CSR has continued to gain importance in managerial practice (Knox and Maklan, 2004).
Drawing upon the above arguments, while positive CSR is an asset for the firm, 
negative CSR is a potential liability. To the extent that this liability can be offset by 
positive CSR firms, which are sensitized to the negative effects of their operations, are 
likely to simultaneously engage in positive and negative behaviors (Strike, Gao and 
Bansal, 2006). We refer to this set of CSR activities as reactive corporate social 
responsibility (RCSR). However, CSR needs not necessarily be reactive. Corporate desire 
to build reputational capital (Fombrun et al., 2000), employee commitment (Turban and 
Greening, 1996), trust (Frank, 1996) or moral capital (Godfrey, 2005) among its 
stakeholders, could also engage in positive CSR behaviors. We group these CSR 




This section draws upon existing literature to develop a set of four hypothesis 
relating CSR to economic conditions, market conditions, brand/product differentiation, 
and corporate governance.
Economic conditions: Economic conditions affect the degree to which corporations act in 
socially responsible ways (Campbell, 2007). Margolis and Walsh (2001) reviewed ninety 
empirical studies on CSR, from 1972 to 2002. According to their survey, firms whose 
financial performance is weak are less likely to engage in positive CSR activities. 
Extending this line of reasoning, we suggest that, firms are likely to give up proactive 
CSR than reactive CSR during difficult financial times. Thus, our first hypothesis 
presented below is a variant of Campbell (2007) proposition 1:
H1: Financially weak firms are less likely to invest in CSR activities.
Level of competition: Campbell (2007) suggests that the level of competition in the 
market will affect the firm’s attitude towards CSR. In situations where the competition 
level is very high, corporations are likely to have narrow profit margins and hence it is a
natural tendency for them to cut expense wherever possible. In such a situation, CSR 
might fail to figure prominently in the decision making of the firm. On the other hand, if 
the level of competition is too low or non-existent, concerns about corporate reputations 
or customer loyalty is less likely to affect managerial decision-making. Arguably, when 
firms have less distress of getting squeezed out of the market and are assured a relatively 
wider profit margin under normal competition, consumers will have enough choices so as 
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to make managers sensitive to the issues of customer loyalty and corporate reputation. 
Thus our second hypothesis is in line with Campbell (2007) proposition 2.
H2: Firms situated in industries where the level of competition is either too high or 
too low, are less likely to invest in CSR activities.
CSR as an instrument of differentiation: McWilliams and Siegel (2000) hypothesize that 
corporations could embody their products with socially responsible attributes as a means 
to satisfy consumer demand for CSR and thereby differentiate their product in market 
place. This approach to differentiation could require firms to invest more in research and 
development. Therefore, our third hypothesis follows McWilliams and Siegel (2000) 
hypothesis 1.
H3: There is positive correlation between the level of product differentiation (a 
proxy for which is the firm’s R&D to sales ratio) and the level of positive CSR. 
Corporate governance and CSR: Existing literature provides at least two competing 
hypothesis relating corporate governance and the CSR activities of the firm. First, the 
strategic choice hypothesis supported by Surroca and Tribo (2008) suggests that non-
performing managers tend to use CSR as a strategic tool for satisfying other stakeholders. 
If so we should then see a negative relationship between corporate governance and CSR. 
A competing hypothesis originating from conflict resolution literature supported by 
Calton and Payne (2003), Jensen (2001) and Scherer et al.(2006) suggest that 
corporations are subject to close scrutiny by non-investing stakeholders, such as 
environmental and other activists. Effective corporate governance managers utilize CSR 
engagement to resolve conflicts with these stakeholders and hence to maximize the 
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shareholders’ wealth (Chung, Elder, and Kim, 2010). The conflict-resolution hypothesis 
suggests a positive relationship between corporate governance and CSR. Jo, and Harjoto 
(2011) find evidence in support of the conflict resolution hypothesis. If effective 
managers are using CSR as a means for satisfying non-investing stakeholders, we believe 
their activities are more likely to be in the realm of reactive CSR than proactive CSR.
H4: There is positive relationship between effective governance and CSR.
Data and methodology
We use the period from 2001 through 2010 for this analysis. We get Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) data from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) 
database. Extant studies have typically aggregated the various KLD dimensional scores 
into an index to proxy for the overall CSR of the firm (Ullmann, 1985; Waddock and 
Graves, 1997; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008). In doing so these studies have implicitly 
assumed cardinality across the various dimensions. This can be potentially problematic,
as KLD scores are ordinal in nature. Therefore, a score of +2 on Environment strengths is 
better than a score of +1 on Environment strengths. However, it might be difficult to 
argue that a score of +1 on Environment is precisely the same as +1 on Community, or 
+1 on Corporate Governance, etc. Therefore aggregating the dimensions by simply 
summing them up into an index could result in potentially erroneous representation of the 
firm CSR.
Another potential problem of aggregating the various dimensions of CSR into an 
index is the loss of information regarding the nature of complementarity between these 
dimensions. Cavaco and Crifo (2010) define complementarity as a specific combination 
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of firm policies that would likely lead to superior corporate performance. Two or more 
practices are complements when using one more intensely increases the marginal benefit 
of using others more intensively.  By this logic, a simple aggregation of strengths and 
concerns leads to a loss of opportunity to understand the synergies that come from 
complementary practices.
In order to demonstrate the notion of complementarity we did a correlation for all 
the dimensions of strengths and concerns of CSR within the KLD database.  Table 2
reports a positive correlation across all except the “gender diversity concerns” dimension. 
A possible source of the positive correlation between concerns and strengths could be the 
complementarity between them, whereby strengths compliment concerns, as suggested in 
the idea of reactive CSR (RCSR) outlined in the previous section. The use of an 
aggregate index hides the effects of these complementarities. For example, a firm 
receiving +1 on Environment concern and +1 on Environment Strength receives net zero 
score on environment. This firm gets treated at par with another firm with no role in 
environment (zero on strength and zero on concern). The central limitation of the 
aggregation method emphasizes the needs of using a more apt methodological tool to 
extract the common components across dimensions; one such approach is principal 
component analysis.
Principal component analysis
The principal component analysis (PCA) was developed in the early 20th century 
(Pearson, 1901; Hotelling, 1933) for the purpose of aggregating information scattered 
across multiple correlated numeric variables. We recommend the use of PCA technique 
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for aggregating the KLD category scores. PCA constructs factors to maximize 
explanatory power within a set of related variables.2 ijxFor example, let represents the 
CSR score (as assigned by KLD) for dimension i (fourteen dimensions of CSR as tracked 
by KLD) and sample firm j. Given 14 dimensions and N sample firms, let 
1 2 3 14, , , ,X X X X? be vectors of length N such that ? ?' 1 2, , ,i i i iNX x x x? ? . Let X be the 
matrix ? ?1 2 14, , ,X X X? , and let ? be the covariance matrix of X. Consider a linear 
combination of these variables defined as:
'
1 1 2 2 3 3 14 14 (1)k k k k k kY X X X X X? ? ? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??
The variance of kY is then defined as
'
k X? ? .
If the vector j? is chosen to maximize the variance of kY , then kY is referred to as 
the first principal component. The second principal component is the linear combination 
that maximizes the variance of kY subject to the condition that it be uncorrelated with the 
first principal component. A maximum of 14 principal components can be constructed 
successively in our case, each subject to the condition that the ith component must be 
orthogonal with the already generated (i-1) components. Together these 14 principal 
components provide the same information as the original fourteen dimensions. In other 






?? ? . The principal components can be interpreted as functions of 
the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of ? . The variance of the first principal component, 
? ?1 1Var Y? ? , equals the first eigenvalue of ? and the coefficient vector, 1? equals the 
first eigenvector. Similar interpretation can be assigned to the remaining thirteen 
principal components. 
                                                        




Principal component analysis is potentially sensitive to the units in which the 
underlying variables are measured. Fortunately, measurement units are not a concern here 
because the CSR ratings are simply the total number of concerns and the total number of 
strengths in the various categories. However, the number of areas of strengths and 
concerns varies from one dimension of CSR to another and occasionally from one year to 
another. Therefore, to facilitate aggregation of information from across the dimensions 
and more importantly to facilitate comparison across various years, we standardize the 
ratings.3
KLD data covers approximately 80 indicators in seven major categories. Each 
category has a number of strengths and concern items, where a binary measure indicates 
either its presence or absence. The number of items in each category often varies from 
year to year, thus making it difficult to compare the raw measures across time. To get 
around this problem, we standardize the categories within each year by taking the 
company’s summed score for a given category, subtracting from it the mean score in the 
same category across all companies for the same year, and dividing the resulting 
difference by the standard deviation in that category for that year. We extract two 
principal components from the fourteen transformed variables.
Other variables
Following existing research in strategic management and CSR (See Jayachandran 
et. al., 2013), we use Tobin’s Q and ROA as two measures of firm’s financial 
                                                        
3 Alternatively, we could extract the eigenvalues and the corresponding eigenvectors from the 
correlation matrix instead of the covariance matrix. To the extent that KLD scores are ordinal in 
nature, Polychoric correlation matrix should be used instead of the Pearson correlations. However, 
Kolenikov and Angeles (2009) show that PCA of ordinal data using both Pearson and Polychoric 
correlations produce similar results.
12 
 
performance. Following Jayachandran et.al. 2013, we use the formulae proposed by 
Chung and Pruitt (1994) for computing Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is defined here as:
? ?Q MVE PS DEBT TA? ? ? ---- (3)
where MVE is the product of a firm’s share price and the number of common stock 
shares outstanding, PS is the liquidation value of the firm’s outstanding preferred stock, 
DEBT is the value of the firm’s short-term liabilities net of its short term assets, plus the 
book value of the firm’s long term debt, and TA is the book value of the total assets of 
the firm. ROA is estimated as the ratio of net income to total assets. While Tobin’s Q is 
arguably a forward-looking measure of the firm’s financial performance, ROA reflects 
the current period performance.
Following Hull and Rothenberg (2008), we proxy innovation using three years 
average R&D spending (research and development spending) to sales ratio. We use sales-
based Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to estimate market concentration. This index is 
the sum of the squared values of sales of each firm as a fraction of the total sales for all 
firms in the given industry group. If an industry group has only one firm, its HHI is one; 
if an industry group has ten firms and that each contributes 10% of the sales, its 
Herfindahl index is 0.1. Hence, the Herfiridahi index falls as the degree of industry 
concentration increases. We use the Chung, Elder, and Kim (2010) corporate governance 
index to measure the quality of governance in the firm. The more popular GIM (2003) 
index is designed primarily to capture managerial entrenchment through antitakeover 
provisions in the firm’s charter, its bylaws and state laws (Cremers, and Nair, 2005).
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Extant research suggests that size, leverage, industry, and the age of the firm are 
some of the other characteristics, which affect a firm’s CSR activities (Cochran and 
Wood, 1984; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008). These are 
included in the model as control variables. Size is a relevant variable because larger firms 
are likely to have higher level of CSR, vis-à-vis smaller firms (Burk et al., 1986). We 
measure firm size using three distinct proxies: total assets, total sales and by the number 
of employees in the firm. Following Jayachandaran, Kalaignanam, and Eilert (2013), 
financial leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. We infer firm 
age from each firm’s first CRSP listing date. To the extent that a firm can exist as a 
private entity before it goes public, our age variable is truncated. However, the resulting 
bias would cause us to underestimate, rather than overestimate firm age and hence this is 
a conservative proxy. We use year-specific fixed effects to control for time trends and 
industry specific fixed effects to control for the industry effects. We follow Fama and 
French 12 industry classification for creating the industry groups. This classification is 
similar to the industry definition followed by Waddock and Graves (1997). It is 
determined using the four digit SIC of the firm. Doz, et al. (1981), Yip (2003), Bartlett et 
al. (2004) among several others imply that multinational corporations use CSR focused at 
local needs of their multiple markets as a means of generating global brand recognition. 
To the extent that such firms might be different from single market firms in their 
approach to CSR, we introduce I_dummy which takes the value 1 if the firm operating in 




Table 1, Panel A provides some descriptive statistics describing the sample of 
firms used in this study. The sample spans across 10 years from 2001 through 2010 and 
the average number of firms in each year is about 2177. The size of the sample firms 
ranges from smallest firm employing 15 individuals to the largest firm employing 
176,960. The spread is reflected in the total assets as well as the net sales data. The three 
variables are different measures of firm size. Firm age counts the number of years that the 
firm has been publicly trading. R&D to sales data is missing for roughly 47% of the data. 
These firms are treated as zero R&D firms. Table 1, Panel B reports descriptive statistics
describing the Fama-French 12-industry classification that we have used in this study for 
estimating industry concentration. N represents the average annual number of firms in 
each industry group. HHI column reports the average annual Herfindhal index for each 
industry group. Majority of the firms in our sample operate only in the US market 
(I_Dummy=0).
Table 2 presents the pairwise correlations between standardized ratings for 
various CSR dimensions. Most correlations are positive suggesting the existence of 
complementarity across various strengths and concerns dimension. Curiously, gender 
diversity stands out among all the concern dimensions. Figure 1, Panel A provides a 
snapshot of the correlation between a firm’s gender diversity concerns and its various 
CSR strengths. These concerns are negatively correlated with all strengths except for a 
small positive correlation with corporate governance strengths. Contrasting Figure 1, 
Panel A with Figure 1, Panel B through G suggests that while firms potentially try to 
rectify poor CSR record in other categories by simultaneously investing in one or more 
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CSR strengths, they don’t seem to be doing the same in the case of gender diversity 
concerns. The results from Table 2 further seem to suggest that firms with significant 
gender diversity concerns tend to also have relatively high employee relations concerns 
such as poor union relations, poor employee’s health and safety issues, larger layoffs, 
underfunded pension funds, etc. However, they seem to be on average doing better on 
issues of environment, human rights and product (safety, contracting controversy, 
antitrust violations, etc.).
Table 3 presents the factor loadings for the first and the second principal 
components (PC).  The first eigenvalue of the fourteen standardized CSR dimensions is 
3.407. This implies that 3.407/14=24.34% of the total variation across these dimensions 
can be explained by a single common factor (first PC). Similarly, the second eigenvalue 
is 1.255, suggesting that 8.96% of the remaining variations can be explained by the 
second factor (second PC). The third through fifth eigenvalues are very close to 1 and the 
remaining nine are less than 1, indicating that additional common factors are negligible. 
Figure 2, Panel A presents the eigenvector loadings from the first principal 
component for the fourteen CSR dimensions (seven strengths and seven weaknesses). As 
expected from the significant positive correlations reported in Table 2, the first principal 
component is loading positively on thirteen out of the total fourteen dimensions of CSR 
used in this study. To the extent that positive correlation between various CSR concerns
and CSR strengths (Table 2 and Figure 1, Panels B through G) could suggest a
relationship of complementarity across these dimensions, thereby at least some of the 
positive CSR investments coming from the various corporations are an attempt on their 
parts to rectify the negative effects of CSR concerns generated in the daily course of their 
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existence. The first principal component potentially identifies the magnitude of 
complementarity across the various dimensions of CSR. We interpret this component as a 
measure of reactive CSR (RCSR). An increase in this component would suggest an 
increase in all the strengths and the concerns dimensions of CSR. This could represent 
the firm taking on increased levels of positive CSR in order to counter the negative 
effects of increased CSR concerns. While theoretically this could also suggest the firm 
responding to its increased positive CSR capital by allowing its CSR concerns to increase,
this is extremely unlikely. A reduction in this component could signal reduced concerns 
and as a result reduced reactive positive CSR investments.
Figure 2, Panel B presents the eigenvector loadings from the second principal
component for the fourteen CSR dimensions. The second principal component loads
negatively on all strengths and positively on all concerns. This component can be 
interpreted as a contrast measure between various CSR concerns and CSR strengths.  An 
increase in its magnitude would result in increased CSR concerns and reduced CSR 
strengths. Similarly, a decrease in its magnitude would represent increasing CSR 
strengths and decreasing CSR concerns. This component may be interpreted as an inverse 
measure of proactive CSR (PCSR). In this case, we multiply the second principal 
component by -1 and take the resulting value as a proxy for PCSR.
Table 4 reports the Pearson correlations between the various variables used in this 
study. PCSR (second principal component times -1) is negatively correlated with firm 
size (ln assets), age of the firm (ln_age), and leverage. This suggests that larger firms, as 
well as older firms and firms with higher level of debt seem to be investing relatively less 
in proactive CSR. PCSR is also positively correlated with R&D expenses, ROA, Tobin’s 
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Q, and governance index (g_score). Thereby lending some preliminary support to 
hypothesis one, three and four. Thus, financially well-performing firms, and, firms which 
invest relatively more in research and development, as well as firms with better corporate 
governance seem to invest more in proactive CSR. The first principal component (RCSR) 
is positively correlated with firm size, firm age, leverage, firm performance (ROA), and 
corporate governance. Thereby, larger and older firms, firms with higher levels of debt, 
strong current financial performance and good corporate governance are likely to invest 
more in reactive CSR. This could represent the set of firms, which are potentially 
generating high CSR concerns in course of their everyday operations, and they invest in 
positive CSR to rectify the negatives. RCSR is negatively correlated with R&D expenses 
and Tobin’s Q ratio, suggesting that firms which invest more in research and 
development as well as those with strong forward looking financial position (TQ) are 
better at keeping their negative CSR activities lower and as a result need to invest less in 
reactive CSR.
Multivariate regression analysis 
Table 4 results are univariate and hence caution is warranted in their interpretation. 
Table 5 presents the results of multivariate regression analysis. This table presents the 
coefficient estimates for the following model:
where: CSR is measured by RCSR and PCSR, represents the two proxies for CSR. ROA 
is the return on assets (a measure of the firm’s current period financial performance). 
Tobin’s Q (TQ) is a forward-looking measure of the firm’s financial performance. 
18 
 
RD_sales is the firm’s research and development expenses, per dollar of sales (three year 
average calculated over current year and two lagging years). We are using it here as a 
proxy for the level of product differentiation (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). g_scores is 
corporate governance index as measured in Chung, Elder, and Kim (2010). For our 
sample g_score ranges from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 20 with a median of 9. 
HHI is the sales based Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. It is a measure of industry 
concentration. We use the Fama-French twelve-industry classification in this paper. HHI2 
is the square of HHI. The second order term is inserted to allow us to test for hypothesis 2.
We use three related proxies for size (ln(assets), ln(sales) and ln(number of employees)). 
The results remain unchanged. Table 5 reports the results using ln(assets) as the proxy for 
firm size. Firm age proxy estimates the age of the firm from its CRSP listing date. Lev 
(Financial leverage) is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. And, 
I_dummy takes the value 1 if the firm operates in multiple markets and zero otherwise. 
All single market firms in our sample are firms operating in the US domestic market only.
The model also contains nine-year dummies representing 2002 through 2010. All reduced 
forms of equation (3) which do not include HHI as an explanatory variable, control for 
industry effect using eleven industry dummies.
Panel A of table 5 estimates equation (3) and eight of its reduced forms relating 
firm and market characteristics to RCSR (first principal component). Since these 
regressions use panel data, where a single firm could appear multiple times (potentially 
once every year), the OLS standard errors might be biased. We address this concern 
through the use of firm-clustered bootstrap standard errors (Cameron, Gelbach, Miller, 
2008) to draw all inferences. RCSR is positively related to ROA, Tobin’s Q, R&D to 
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Sales, suggesting that firms with better performance are on average also firms which 
potentially generate more CSR concerns in course of their operation. Their good financial 
position allows them to simultaneously invest in positive CSR activities in attempt to 
mitigate the adverse effects of the negative CSR. RCSR is negatively related to corporate 
governance index, which suggests that ceteris paribus, firms with better corporate 
governance are able to potentially reduce CSR concerns and thereby they require less 
investment in reactive CSR. RCSR is found to be positively related to HHI and 
negatively related to HHI2. Therefore, firms situated in industries where the level of 
competition is neither too high nor too low, are more likely to invest in RCSR activities. 
The results also suggest that larger and older firm’s, with lower debt levels, and operating 
in multiple markets are likely to invest more in RCSR.
Panel B, Table 5 estimates equation (3) and eight of its reduced forms relating 
firm and market characteristics to PCSR (second principal component multiplied by -1). 
All standard errors are estimated using bootstrap methodology with firm-clustering
(Cameron, Gelbach, Miller, 2008). We find that the PCSR is positively related to ROA, 
Tobin’s Q, R&D to sales, and the governance index. On average, firms with good 
financial position (ROA and TQ), high R&D firms, as well as firms with good corporate 
governance tend to invest more in proactive CSR activities. These results support 
hypothesis one, three, and four. We also find that PCSR is positively related to HHI and 
negatively related to HHI2. PCSR loads positively on CSR strengths and negatively on 
CSR concerns after being multiplied by -1, therefore the results suggest that firms in 
lowest concentration and highest concentration industries are less likely to invest in 
Proactive CSR. This result supports hypothesis two.
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Comparing Table 5, Panel A and B results point to several similarities and 
differences, which are noteworthy. We find that while bigger firms invest in more 
reactive CSR (RCSR), smaller firms seem to invest more in PCSR. A possible 
explanation for the RCSR result could be that larger firms potentially generate greater 
negative CSR in course of their daily operations and therefore the firm invests more in 
CSR aimed towards rectifying those concerns. Table 5, both panels suggest that 
controlling for other characteristics, older firms tend to invest more in CSR. This result is 
in concurrence with the findings of Jo and Harjoto (2011). They interpret this result to 
suggest that older firms can afford more CSR. Table 5 also finds that more levered firms 
(firms with greater level of debt financing) tend to invest less on CSR. This result is 
consistent with the interpretation of leverage as a measure of financial risk, whereby 
more risky firms are able to afford relatively less CSR activities (McGuire, Sundgren and 
Schneeweis, 1988).
A final result that may be inferred from Table 5 is the difference between single 
market and multiple market firms with respect to their CSR activities. The positive and 
significant coefficient for I_Dummy in Panel A, and negative non-significant coefficient 
in Panel B suggests that firms operating in multiple markets tend to invest significantly 
more than a firm operating in single market, on reactive CSR. However there is no 
difference between the two groups of firms when it comes to proactive CSR.
Piecewise linear regression analysis 
While the quadratic term in equation (3) representing the linear and second order 
terms for industry concentration could provide evidence in support of or against 
hypothesis two, the fitted functional form is not necessarily accurate. Piecewise linear 
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regression is an alternate approach for testing this hypothesis. In this case, apart from 
testing the second hypothesis, the spline function can provide information about at what 
levels of industry concentration CSR activity of the firm increases versus declines.
We estimate piecewise linear regressions allowing for four changes in the slope 
coefficient on industry concentration (HHI). We partition the sample firms into quintiles
based on their HHI level. We select four knots for the spline model, defined as:
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Table 6 presents the results of piecewise linear regression relating HHI to RCSR 
and PCSR. While the overall results of this analysis are in concurrence with the results in 
Table 5, two interesting observations which can be drawn from Table 6 and figure 3 are: 
as the level of competition decreases (HHI increases), both RCSR and PCSR tend to 
increase. This trend continues across 80% of our sample firms for RCSR but 40% for 
PCSR. Both types of CSR see sharp decline for the firms situated in the least competitive
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industry. Comparing the coefficients of HHI_5_5 across the two models suggests that the
decline is much higher for PCSR than for RCSR. This is confirmed in Figure 3 where the 
fifth line segment slopes downward in both of the RCSR and the PCSR plot. However the 
slope is much higher in PCSR than for RCSR. This result suggests that in low
competition (limiting case of which is a monopoly) environment where firms have very 
strong market position with little societal accountability, they tend to reduce investments 
in all types of CSR. However, we see a much greater reduction in PCSR than RCSR.
Robust Regression analysis
OLS estimates can be biased if the underlying assumption of normality of the 
residuals is not satisfied. Some of the popular approaches for ensuring normality are
winsorizing the data and/or transforming the variables. An alternate approach can be to 
use median regresion instead of OLS (Neter et al,. 1996). Median regression (which is a 
special case among the set of Quantile regressions) is a member of the family of robust 
regressions and it is designed to reduce the influence of outliers. Median regression 
minimizes the sum of absolute deviations instead of the sum of squared deviations so that 
the precise value of the dependent variable in a median regression matters only in 
determining whether the observation has a positive or negative residual. If the residual is 
positive or negative, the dependent variable can increase toward infinity (minus infinity) 
without affecting the estimated parameters. 4
                                                        
4 For more detailed discussion of median regression refer to Koenker and Bassett 
(1982). 
Table 7 presents the results of median 
regression with boot strapped standard errors. The table replicates some of the models of 




This paper explores the firm and market characteristics, which potentially define 
corporate choice to invest in socially responsible activities. Our methodology deviates 
from the more popular approach of seeing CSR as a unitary construct. Instead, we 
propose decomposing it into multiple dimensions. More specifically, this paper divides 
CSR into two broad groups. First: reactive CSR which consists of all socially responsible 
activities undertaken by the firm with the intention to counter any potential fallout from 
negative CSR that the firm might be generating as a part of its daily operations.  And, 
second: proactive CSR, which may be understood simply as all not reactive CSR. This 
decomposition is dictated by our choice of statistical methodology. We extract principal 
components from the fourteen dimensions of CSR that are reported in KLD. We find that 
the first two components are able to explain about 33.3% of all the variability across the 
fourteen dimensions. The first component explains about 24.34% while the second 
component picks up 8.96%. We find that the first principal component loads positively
on all strengths and all CSR concern dimensions. This component quantifies the 
commonality across the CSR strengths and CSR concerns. We interpret it as a measure of 
reactive CSR. The second component loads positively on CSR concerns and loads 
negatively on CSR strengths. An increase in this component would suggest increased 
concerns and simultaneous decline in strengths, and vice versa. We interpret the second 
component to be an inverse measure of proactive CSR.  
We explore the relationship between our measures of reactive and proactive CSR 
and various firm and market characteristics. We find that while firms with greater level of 
debt financing on their books tend to invest relatively less in CSR, older firms invest 
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more in CSR. Our results also suggest that larger firms tend to invest relatively more on 
reactive CSR and less on proactive CSR. Existing literature suggests that firms operating 
in multiple markets tend to invest more in CSR. We find that while this is true for 
reactive CSR, these firms are no different from single market firms in terms of proactive 
CSR activities. Our results suggest that financially strong firms, firms with greater 
investments in R&D, and firms located in industries with neither too low nor too high 
concentration, tend to make maximum CSR investment. A closer look at this result 
reveals that as the level of competition decreases (increasing HHI), firms tend to increase 
their investment in both reactive CSR as well as proactive CSR. However, as the firm’s 
market power increases (tending towards monopolistic positions) they start to cut down 
these investments. Firms seem to reduce proactive CSR much more than reactive CSR.  
Exploring the linkage between corporate governance and CSR activities of the 
firm, we find that better governed firms are more successful in reducing their firm’s 
negative CSR output, thereby, saving on reactive CSR. Firms with better corporate 
governance also tend to invest more on proactive CSR. The two results together suggest 
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These graphs illustrate the relation between each CSR concerns and all the seven 
dimensions in strength. DIV, ENV, HUM, CGOV, EMP, COM, and PRO are defined 
respectively as seven different KLD sectors, namely, diversity, environment, human 
rights, corporate governance, employee relations, community, and products. Variable 
names ended with “_con” represent the concern scores recorded, while those ended with 
“_str” stand for strength scores.
31 
 
Figure 2. Eigenvectors from principal components analysis on standardized CSR scores.
Panel A
Panel B
The figure plots the eigenvector loadings from the first two principal components 
for the seven strengths and seven weakness dimensions of the CSR scores available from 
the KLD database. The dimensions are: Corporate governance (CGOV), Community 







































































































































Second Principal component 
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Figure 3. Fitted spline functions (equation 5).
Panel A:
Panel B: 
These graphs plot the spline regression result for equation 5. Penal A shows how 





































Table 1. Summary Statistics
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of main variables on a firm-year basis.
Panel B reports the sample statistics based on the Fama-French 12 industry portfolios. 
Median value is taken for HHI, which is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated for 
every industry group, across 10 sample years (2001-2010). Firm Years stands for the 
number of firms categorized in a specific group. Domestic is the number of firms 




Years Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
Number of employees
(in thousands) 21385 9.418 2.500 19.241 0.015 176.960
Total Assets
(in millions) 21753 4945.350 711.674 12116.610 34.491 151100.000
Net Sales (in millions) 21745 2566.740 1245.740 5326.820 1.650 52935.230
Leverage 21690 0.195 0.140 0.216 0 5.945
ROA 21256 0.021 0.033 0.106 -0.710 0.247
Firm Age 21772 18.993 14.000 17.094 0 85.000
3 year average
R&D to Sale 11363 0.196 0.028 0.809 0 12.788
Panel B:
Dummy
Industry Group Firm Years HHI Domestic International
Consumer Non-Durables 1171 0.0227 1103 68
Consumer Durables 506 0.0769 484 22
Manufacturing 2293 0.0115 2162 131
Energy 977 0.0539 894 83
Chemicals 587 0.0339 569 18
Business Equipment 3897 0.0186 3565 332
Telecom 653 0.0229 593 60
Utilities 802 0.0132 774 28
Shops 2261 0.0226 2177 84
Healthcare 2349 0.0298 2144 205
Finance 5136 0.0106 4913 223
Others 2612 0.0171 2515 97
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Table 2. Correlations between various standardized CSR dimensions
This table lists the Pearson correlations between the fourteen KLD dimensions. 
CGOV, COM, DIV, and EMP variables represent corporate governance, community, 
diversity, and the Employee categories of the CSR scores. ENV, HUM, PRO measure 
Environment, Human rights and Product categories. _con stands for concerns, while _str 
represents the strength dimensions in the various categories. The correlations numbers 
represent the average annual correlations between the fourteen CSR dimensions. 
CGOV_co CGOV_str COM_con COM_str DIV_con DIV_str EMP_con
CGOV_c 1
CGOV_st -0.1090 1***
COM_co 0.1340 0.0420*** 1***
COM_str 0.1875 0.1070*** 0.1485*** 1***
DIV_con -0.0435 0.0400*** -0.0270** -0.0935* 1***
DIV_str 0.2830 0.0800*** 0.1170*** 0.3185*** -0.3310*** 1***
EMP_con 0.1385 0.0155*** 0.0990 0.0575*** 0.0430*** 0.1280*** 1***
EMP_str 0.2050 0.0150*** 0.1650*** 0.2505*** -0.1080*** 0.2975*** 0.1035***
ENV_con
***
0.1295 0.0110*** 0.2725*** 0.1110*** -0.0315*** 0.0735*** 0.1845***
ENV_str
***
0.1520 0.1260*** 0.1410*** 0.2180*** -0.0755*** 0.1780*** 0.1480***
HUM_co
***
0.1800 0.0490*** 0.1780*** 0.1930*** -0.0190*** 0.1730* 0.1315***
HUM_str
***
0.0655 0.0815*** 0.0620*** 0.1465*** -0.0325*** 0.0870* 0.0465***
PRO_con
**
0.2535 0.0200*** 0.2000*** 0.2395*** -0.0645*** 0.2385*** 0.1385***
PRO_str
***
0.1595 0.0465*** 0.0535*** 0.1720** -0.0370*** 0.1645* 0.0955*** ***
EMP_str ENV_con ENV_str HUM_con HUM_str PRO_con PRO_str
EMP_str 1
ENV_con 0.1960 1***
ENV_str 0.2775 0.2940*** 1***
HUM_co 0.1315 0.1880*** 0.1460*** 1***
HUM_str 0.0765 0.0245*** 0.0865* 0.1855*** 1***
PRO_con 0.1615 0.2140*** 0.1490*** 0.1905*** 0.0470*** 1***
PRO_str 0.2280 0.0630*** 0.2170*** 0.0820*** 0.0365*** 0.1060* 1***
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
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Table 3. Principal component analysis factor loadings and communality.
PCA 1 is the first principal component representing the reactive CSR. PCA 2 is 
defined as the second principal component, the proactive CSR.
Component
PCA 1 (RCSR) PCA2 (Inv_PCSR) Communalities
PRO_str 0.404 -0.341 0.270
DIV_str 0.685 -0.339 0.095
COM_str 0.632 -0.285 0.393
EMP_str 0.594 -0.195 0.481
HUM_str 0.272 -0.183 0.204
CGOV_str 0.249 -0.183 0.584
ENV_str 0.611 -0.088 0.283
CGOV_con 0.511 0.098 0.391
PRO_con 0.583 0.169 0.522
HUM_con 0.463 0.296 0.381
EMP_con 0.398 0.353 0.302
COM_con 0.471 0.414 0.107
DIV_con -0.150 0.427 0.368
ENV_con 0.543 0.477 0.280
Eigenvalue 3.407 1.255
% of variance 24.33% 8.97%
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Table 4. Correlation Matrix.
This table provides the correlation matrix of various variables used in regression analysis. Ln(Assets) is calculated as the 
logarithm of total asset of the firm. Ln(age) is taking the logarithm value of years since the firm got public. Leverage is defined as the 
financial leverage ratio. RD_Sales is the ratio of research and development expenditure to net sales. ROA is the return on asset for the 
firm in the specific sample year. TQ represents the firm’s Tobin’s Q. g_score is the proxy for governance. RCSR and Inv_PCSR 
signify respectively reactive CSR and proactive CSR.
Ln(Assets) ln(age) Leverage RD_Sales ROA TQ g_score RCSR Inv_PCSR
Ln(Assets) 1
ln(age) .373** 1
Leverage .213** .031** 1
RD_Sales -.253** -.113** -.143** 1
ROA .016* .084** .040** -.313** 1
TQ -.365** -.185** -.375** .341** .165** 1
g_score .053** .190** -.056** -.069** .064** -.038** 1
RCSR .599** .355** .056** -.038** .091** -.096** .088** 1
Inv_PCSR -.071** -.049** -.126** .092** 0.031** .090** 0.016 0 1
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
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Table 5. Regression results.
These tables illustrate the results of regression analysis. In Panel A, coefficients are estimated with the first principal 
component (RCSR) as the dependent variable, while in Panel B, the second principal component (Inv_PCSR) is considered as the 
dependent variable for the regressions. Ln(Assets) is calculated as the logarithm of total asset of the firm. Ln(age) is taking the 
logarithm value of years since the firm got public. Leverage is defined as the financial leverage ratio. I_dummy is a dummy variable 
takes value of 1, if the company operates on a multinational basis, and 0 if the company operates only in a single market. ROA is the 
return on asset for the firm in the specific sample year. TQ represents the firm’s Tobin’s Q. RD_Sales is the ratio of research and 
development expenditure to net sales. g_score is the proxy for governance. HHI and HH2 represent the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
and the square of HHI respectively. From Model 1 to Model 6, both year-fixed and industry-fixed effects are applied in the regressions, 
but for Model 7, 8, and 9, only year effect is fixed.
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Panel A: Reactive CSR (RCSR) as dependent variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Constant -3.2177*** -3.2366*** -3.4427*** -3.2633*** -4.2815*** -4.6451*** -3.9804*** -4.2712*** -5.4342***
(0.0621) (0.0625) (0.0651) (0.0623) (0.0825) (0.0871) (0.0647) (0.0676) (0.0903)
Ln(Assets) 0.4121*** 0.4115*** 0.4225*** 0.4168*** 0.5459*** 0.556*** 0.3627*** 0.3882*** 0.4889***
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0086) (0.0085) (0.0057) (0.006) (0.0078)
ln(age) 0.1051*** 0.1045*** 0.1139*** 0.107*** 0.1321*** 0.1408*** 0.1816*** 0.1827*** 0.2383***
(0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0109)
Leverage -0.6043*** -0.6014*** -0.4471*** -0.593*** -0.8504*** -0.6969*** -0.4569*** -0.2756*** -0.3489***
(0.0342) (0.0341) (0.0347) (0.0339) (0.0503) (0.0522) (0.031) (0.0319) (0.0497)
I_Dummy 0.5229*** 0.5223*** 0.508*** 0.5069*** 0.5657*** 0.5194*** 0.601*** 0.5265*** 0.5762***
(0.0408) (0.0408) (0.0406) (0.0407) (0.0476) (0.0472) (0.0426) (0.0418) (0.0498)
ROA 0.1403** 1.0829*** 0.7117*** 1.8287***
(0.0573) (0.1099) (0.0648) (0.1122)
TQ 0.0155*** 0.0056*** 0.0134*** 0.0042***
(0.001) (0.0016) (0.001) (0.0016)
RD_Sales 0.7404*** 1.2699*** 0.973*** 1.6584***
(0.0516) (0.1136) (0.06) (0.1116)
g_score -0.0062* -0.0069** -0.0003
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033)
HHI 4.2433*** 3.1113*** 3.2217***
(0.1701) (0.1688) (0.2312)
HHI2 -4.7459*** -3.4192*** -3.4747***
(0.2047) (0.2039) (0.2777)
R-sq 0.4818 0.4819 0.4868 0.4851 0.5358 0.5447 0.4401 0.4562 0.5037
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
39 
 
Panel B: proactive CSR (PCSR) as dependent variable. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Constant 0.2315*** 0.1386* 0.149* 0.2185*** 0.3508*** 0.0387 -0.2878*** -0.4281*** -0.4102***
(0.0739) (0.0742) (0.079) (0.0743) (0.1002) (0.1165) (0.0773) (0.1314) (0.1275)
Ln(Assets) -0.0261*** -0.0302*** -0.0225*** -0.0248*** -0.0459*** -0.0416*** -0.0593*** -0.0386*** -0.0384***
(0.0078) (0.0075) (0.0078) (0.0076) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0069) (0.0074) (0.0068)
ln(age) 0.0476*** 0.0444*** 0.0513*** 0.0481*** 0.0391** 0.0427*** 0.0155* 0.0417*** 0.0417***
(0.0101) (0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0162) (0.0154) (0.0092) (0.0157) (0.0157)
Leverage -0.3065*** -0.2891*** -0.2473*** -0.3035*** -0.4343*** -0.3632*** -0.5286*** -0.7794*** -0.7794***
(0.0382) (0.0381) (0.0401) (0.0382) (0.0634) (0.068) (0.0377) (0.0695) (0.0697)
I_Dummy 0.0781* 0.0755 0.0732 0.0737 0.1381** 0.0955 0.0663 0.1 0.1
(0.0455) (0.0454) (0.0479) (0.0475) (0.0617) (0.0674) (0.0482) (0.0673) (0.0623)
ROA 0.7297*** 1.5572*** 1.2361*** 1.2361***
(0.0664) (0.1382) (0.1466) (0.1466)
TQ 0.0056*** -0.0044** 0.0039* 0.0039*
(0.0013) (0.0021) (0.002) (0.002)
RD_Sales 0.1888*** 1.318*** 1.8733*** 1.8733***
(0.0673) (0.1378) (0.1341) (0.1341)
g_score 0.0155*** 0.0138*** -0.0078*
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0046)
HHI 3.5339*** 5.0953*** 5.0953***
(0.4663) (0.0621) (0.0721)
HHI2 -8.343*** -11.524*** -11.524***
(0.919) (1.3481) (1.3481)
R-sq 0.0748 0.0794 0.0755 0.0751 0.1021 0.1136 0.0403 0.065 0.065
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
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Table 6. Spline Regression.
This table reports the regression results using the fixed spline function. HHI is 
divided into 5 groups based on quintiles, with HHI_5_1 being the 1st quintile of the HHI 































*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
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Table 7. Median Regression.
This table illustrates the regression results by replicating models 6 and 9 from 
Table 5 (Panels A and B) using median values.
RCSR PCSR
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) -3.006*** -3.277*** 0.434*** -0.135
(0.045) (0.046) (0.069) (0.133)
Ln(Assets) 0.355*** 0.359*** -0.04*** -0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006)
ln(age) 0.127*** 0.135*** -0.083*** -0.070***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011)
Leverage -0.473*** -0.537*** -0.572*** -0.547***
(0.036) (0.035) (0.055) (0.052)
I_Dummy 0.548*** 0.534*** 0.084 0.066
(0.022) (0.023) (0.033) (0.053)
ROA 0.754*** 0.670*** 0.301*** 0.246**
(0.068) (0.068) (0.103) (0.116)
RD_Sales 1.166*** 1.024*** 0.833*** 0.773***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.069) (0.068)
g_score -0.004* -0.005*** 0.001 0.002





*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.
